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Where are . . four practical advantages to a viable state Bill of
Rights. First, on some matters states can and will go further at any
given time in protecting individual rights than the Supreme Court.
Second, while state courts have many competing interests to reconcile
when considering problems involving conflicts between the state and
individuals, they do not have to feel restrained by the additional
problem of federalism. There have been repeated examples of
restraint by the national government where state interests are also
involved. The Supreme Court, for example, not only considers what
it believes to be the best legal approach to problems, but also the
effect of its decisions on federal-state relations.

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University, School of Law, Camden.
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A third ground is the ability of the states to experiment.
Examples of such experimentation are not easy to find in the
individual rights area. Still, there are some examples and much
potential, particularly in such areas as privacy. Finally, the most
important consideration involves the implementation of rights. It is
one thing for the Supreme Court to say that a particular practice
invaded individual rights, but a completely different matter for all of
the local authorities involved in the practice to correct or discontinue
the activity. It seems that there would be a better chance of local
public officials accepting or enforcing local laws and decisions than
those which emanate from Washington.'
When Professor Robert Force, then an Associate Professor at Indiana
University School of Law, Indianapolis, published the above-quoted words in
Volume Three of the ValparaisoUniversity Law Review twenty-seven years ago,
he probably could not have known that he was anticipating a quarter century of
intense state constitutional activities. In fact, however, Professor Force's toolittle recognized article foresaw virtually all of the major themes and
developments in state constitutional law between 1969 and the present.
Professor Force, after writing his article, moved on to other endeavors in
teaching and scholarship, but a current reading of his article by people deeply
involved in the field results in nods of approval of which he must be proud.
The events leading to Professor Force's choice of the topic of state
constitutional rights were fairly typical of what has led many law professors and
political scientists to an interest in this field-actual involvement with advising
the state legislature, a constitutional commission, or a constitutional
convention.'
My own interest can be traced to a similar "hands-on
experience. "I Professor Force served as a volunteer advisor to a legislative
committee examining the Indiana Declaration of Rights in 1968. This was part
of a larger legislative study of the Indiana Constitution.' The question at the
beginning of Professor Force's article, presented as fictional, about why there
was any real need for a state constitutional Bill of Rights, was, in fact, actually
asked during the course of this real legislative study. His article grew out of his
report to the legislative committee about the function of, and need for, a state

1. Robert Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance,
3 VAL. U. L. REv. 125, 163-64 (1969).
2. Telephone Interview with Robert Force, Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law
(Jan. 29, 1996).
3. I was involved with the development of the 1968 Florida Constitution as a legislative staffer.
See Robert F. Williams, A Generation of Change in Florida State Constitutional Law, 5 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 133, 136-39 (1992).
4. Many states revised, or considered revising, their state constitutions during this period. Id.
at 135.
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constitutional Bill of Rights.
Professor Force also served as General Counsel to the Indiana Chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union. His concern with rights, and the different
sources of their protection, had already led him to an appreciation of the
potential of state constitutions. Another professor from Valparaiso University
Law School was advising a different legislative committee studying the Indiana
Constitution. He and Professor Force became acquainted and when he heard of
the article Professor Force was working on, he asked that it be submitted to the
still-fledgling Valparaiso University Law Review. Professor Force agreed, and
the article was published.
In 1986, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., commented that the
"[riediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their
own citizens by their state constitutions. . . is probably the most important
development in constitutional jurisprudence in our time. "I Justice Brennan is,
of course, generally credited with initiating the attention given to state
constitutional law in the area of individual liberties. 6 Justice Brennan's famous
HarvardLaw Review article, 7 although only published in 1977, is among the
"most frequently cited law review articles of modem time."' Professor Force's
article predated Justice Brennan's by eight years.
In 1969, state constitutional law had barely made a ripple upon the waters
of constitutional law;9 Even the extremely influential work of Justice Hans A.
Linde of Oregon, which began when he was a professor rather than a judge,

5. State ConstitutionalLaw, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-1, quoted in G. Alan Tarr, The
Past and Future of the New JudicialFederalism, 24 PUBuUS: J. FEDERALISM, Spring 1994, at 63,
73.
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). See Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of
Fairness,30 VAL. U. L. Ray. 459, 459 n.2 (1996).
7. See Brennan, supra note 6.
8. Ann Lousin, Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a FederalJudge Who Believes in State's Rights,
20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 2 n.3 (1986). Justice Stewart G. Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme
Court referred to Justice Brennan's article as the "Magna Carta of state constitutional law." Stewart
G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of FundamentalRights, 35 RuTGERS L. REV.
707, 716 (1983).
See also Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutionsas GuardiansofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) (updating his
views).
9. See generallyWilliam F. Swindler, State ConstitutionalLaw: Some RepresentativeDecisions,
9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 166 (1967); Roger H. Thompson, Note, The Theory of State Constitutions,
1966 UTAH L. REV. 542; see also Stanton S. Faville, Dissectinga Constitution, 13 WAYNE L. REv.
549 (1967); Lester J. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV.
326; Peter P. Miller, Note, Freedom of Expression Under State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REv.
318 (1968).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [1996], Art. 13

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

would not appear until the beginning of the 1970s."0 Interestingly, Justice
Linde himself, in 1984, credited Professor Force with beginning the academic
discussion of state constitutional law."
There had been a few earlier
articles,' 2 but none as comprehensive as Professor Force's. Professor Eugene
Wilkes' important work in state constitutional criminal procedure, suggesting
state court "evasion" of conservative
United States Supreme Court decisions,
3
appeared in the mid-1970s.
The California Supreme Court's well-known 1972 decision in People v.
Anderson, 4 declaring the death penalty unconstitutional under the California
Constitution, drew national attention. This decision also sparked the beginning
of a substantial scholarly debate about the legitimacy of independent state

constitutional interpretation in rights cases.'"

Anderson also cast a national

spotlight on the importance of the federal jurisdiction adequate and independent
state ground doctrine as a catalyst for independent state constitutional
interpretation. Justice William 0. Douglas was quick to notice the developments
in California:
A month later, the California Supreme Court decided that the
state's death penalty violated the California constitution's prohibition
against "cruel or unusual punishment." Douglas's chambers got
advance notice of the decision, and within three days, Douglas had
distributed a per curiam draft dismissing the one hundred California
cases that were awaiting the Court's ruling.'

10. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, "Without Due Process": Unconstitutional Law inOregon, 49
OR. L. REy. 125 (1970).
11. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REy. 165,
175 n.23 (1984) ("The rediscovery of state constitutional law is still very new. Contemporary
discussion in the law reviews began only in 1969."). See also Randall T. Shepard, A Bill
of Rights
for the Whole Nation, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 27, 35 n.49 (1991) ("This renaissance in state
constitutional rights litigation was called for some twenty years ago in the Valparaiso University Law
Review." ).
12. See supra note 9.
13. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism inCriminal Procedure: State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 KY. L.J. 729 (1976).
14. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
15. See, e.g.,
Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
750 (1972); Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273 (1973); Donald R. Wright, The Role of the Judiciary:
From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1262 (1972); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Comment,
Anderson and the JudicialFunction, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 739 (1972).
16.

BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHEREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT

212 (1979).
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Now, of course, the New Judicial Federalism is no longer new at all. 7
The United States Supreme Court's 1980 decision in PruneyardShopping Center
v. Robins,'I in which the Court upheld the California Supreme Court's
protection of free speech in privately-owned shopping centers, called national
attention to the potential of state constitutions. HarvardLaw Review devoted
one of its prestigious and influential annual Developments in the Law issues to
the topic in 1982.' 9 In 1983, the United States Supreme Court again called
attention to state constitutional law in Michigan v. Long' in which it
reformulated the adequate and independent ground doctrine. In 1984, the
influential National Conference on Developments in State Constitutional Law
took place in Williamsburg, Virginia.2
The current picture with respect to state constitutional law, therefore, looks
very different from the 1969 situation viewed by Professor Force. Indiana's
Chief Justice, Randall T. Shepard, has written about the Indiana Bill of
Rights.'
He continues his state constitutional law scholarship in this
Symposium.'
A course in state constitutional law is offered at Indiana

17. Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond the "New
Federalism," 8 U. PUOET SOUND L. REV. vi (1985); Ronald K.L. Collins, The Once "New Judicial
Federalism" & Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989).
18. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
19. Symposium, Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State Constitutional Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982). Also in 1982, Justice Shirley Abrahamson of Wisconsin accurately
predicted:
State constitutions are coming out of the archives into the legal literature
and into the classroom. They are coming out of the literature and the
classroom into the courtroom. State constitutions will go from the
courtroom back into the legal literature and into the classroom, and maybe
back to the courtroom, through the lawyers trained in the 1980s.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnationof State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 971 (1982).
20. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In 1983, I was able to claim that "we are experiencing a new
'Constitutional Revolution' in the judicial interpretation of state constitutions." Robert F. Williams,
State ConstitutionalLaw Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 171 (1983).
21. See DEvELOPMENTs IN STATE CONSTITuTIoNAL LAW: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE
(Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
This book, published as a public service by West Publishing Company, has become somewhat of
an "underground classic" in state constitutional law circles.
22. Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575
(1989); Randall T. Shepard, Forewordto Indiana Law, The Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24
IND. L. REV. 499, 504-07 (1991). See also Patrick Baude, Free Speech and the Indiana
Constitution: First Thoughts on Price v. State: Has the Indiana ConstitutionFound Its Epic?, 69
IND. L.J. 849 (1994); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Indiana Supreme Court's Emerging Free Speech
Doctrine, 69 IND. L.J. 857 (1994); Patrick Baude, Is There Independent Life in the Indiana
Constitution?, 62 IND. L.J. 263 (1987).
23. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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University School of Law, Indianapolis, where Professor Force taught in
1969.2 My casebook, which treats state constitutional law as a national topic,
is used at many law schools around the United States. 25 A recent survey
indicated that in 1993 there were twenty-four law professors in twenty-one law
schools teaching courses on state constitutional law.' There are now excellent
treatises available covering state constitutional rights generally' and the area
of state constitutional criminal procedure.'
The fifty-state series of volumes on each state's constitution continues to
grow. This series, published by Greenwood Publishing Group, currently
numbers over twenty volumes with more volumes to be published this coming
year." There have been literally hundreds of law review articles and symposia
published since Professor Force's article appeared." ° Rutgers Law Journalhas
recently published its Seventh Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law. 3 By
1994, Dean Neil H. Cogan could observe:
The legal literature of state fundamental law was, but is no
longer, sparse. This is due in part to a new realization by lawyers and
judges that the form of most state fundamental law is progressive
rather than static, and also to an awakening within many communities
that state fundamental law may be revised by amendment as well as
construction. To put it crassly, there is now movement in state
constitutional law, and there is now a market for books about the

24. In the fall semester of 1995, Professor James W. Torke offered a course in state
constitutional law.
25. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.

1993). This casebook is reviewed in Charles H. Baron, State Constitutional Law: Cases and
Materials, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1077 (1994) (book review). See also NEIL COLMAN MCCABE &
CATHERINE GREENE BURNETT, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1994).
26. Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Observationson the OverlappingSpheres
of State and Federal ConstitutionalLaw, 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 25, 32-33 (1993). See also Robert
F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1991).
27. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES (1994).
28. BARRY LATzER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1995).

29. G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutions and State PoliticalHistory, 81 J. AM. HIST. 1863, 186667 (1995) (appendix listing authors, titles, and dates of the volumes).
30. Earl M. Maltz et al., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 1980-1989, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989).
31. Seventh Annual Issue on State ConstitutionalLaw, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 909 (1995). See also
Symposium, Emerging Issues in State ConstitutionalLaw, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 925 (1994) (an annual
issue for the past five years); Symposium, Emerging Issues in State ConstitutionalLaw, 68 TEMP.
L. REV. 1035 (1995); Annual Issue on New York State ConstitutionalLaw, 11 TOURO L. REv. 729
(1995) (an annual issue for the past five years).
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movement .32

Actually, 1969, the year of Professor Force's article, marks the beginning
of the New Judicial Federalism for another reason. Dr. John Kincaid recently
pointed out that President Richard Nixon's 1969 appointment of Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger reflected the President's campaign promise to turn the United
States Supreme Court in a more conservative direction. This, in turn, as agreed
by most analysts, was a moving force behind the New Judicial Federalism.33
Dr. G. Alan Tarr has argued that, prior to the beginning of the 1970s, the
conditions were not right for the development of an expansive state constitutional
rights jurisprudence.34 He noted:
What was missing was a model of how state judges could develop a
civil liberties jurisprudence. Because Americans had not come to rely
on courts to vindicate civil liberties, state courts throughout the 19th
and early 20th centuries gained little experience in interpreting civil
liberties guarantees.
Nor could they look to federal courts for
guidance in interpreting their constitutional protections. ...
Only
when circumstances brought a combination of state constitutional
arguments, plus an example of how a court might develop
constitutional guarantees, could a state civil liberties jurisprudence
emerge. Put differently, when the Burger Court's anticipated-and to
some extent actual-retreat from Warren Court activism encouraged
civil liberties litigants to look elsewhere for redress, the experience of
the preceding decades had laid the foundation for the development of
state civil liberties law.
This, in turn, suggests that, paradoxically, the activism of the
Warren Court, which was often portrayed as detrimental to federalism,
was a necessary condition for the emergence of a vigorous state
involvement in protecting civil liberties.'
Professor Force's article certainly was there at the beginning of these
developments and was available to provide a roadmap of the progress of the last
twenty-seven years.

32. Neil H. Cogan, Moses and Modemism, 92 McH. L. REv. 1347,1353 (1994) (book review
of three books on state constitutional law).
33. John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New JudicialFederalism,26
RUTGERS L.J. 913, 914-15 (1995).
34. Tart, supra note 5, at 72-73.
35. Id.
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Also, the waves of revision of state constitutional texts through the 1960s
did not focus much on rights provisions.'
Rather, the emphasis was on
modernizing governmental provisions and the tax and finance articles. If state
constitutional rights were to flourish, it would require state courts to make it
happen. All of the necessary conditions were in place by 1969 for this to
happen.
Many of the concepts and perspectives contained in the current scholarly
and judicial doctrines for the judicial protection of state constitutional rights
were anticipated in Professor Force's 1969 article.37 For example, he used the
image of federal constitutional rights as a "floor." "This paper suggests that in
the long run, it will be better to construe Supreme Court decisions involving
conflicts between individuals and states as providing for all states only a floor
or minimum level of protection. "
He warned about the danger of viewing
United States Supreme Court decisions as "ultimates," eliminating any room for
independent state constitutional interpretation. 39 Professor Force also pointed
out that during the early development of constitutional doctrines, treatise writers
such as Judge Thomas Cooley often used federal and state cases together to
illustrate constitutional doctrines.' ° He noted the common law4' origins of
42
constitutional rights as well as the potential for common law and statutory
protection of individual liberties. Professor Force provided an exhaustive, fiftystate comparative study of state constitutional provisions protecting rights.43

36. See Robert S. Rankin, Civil Rights, in COMPACTS OF ANTIQUITY: STATE CONSTITUTIONS
9 (Richard H. Leach ed., 1969); Albert L. Sturm & Kaye M. Wright, Ovil Liberties in Revised
State Constitutions, in CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLICY AND POLICY MAKING 179 (Stephen L. Wasby ed.,
1976).
37. See Force, supra note 1.
38. Id. at 129.
39. Id. See also Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-TheMontanaDisaster,
63 TEx. L. REV. 1095 (1985); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy
of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353 (1984); Robert F.
Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State ConstitutionalRights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
143 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Methodology Problems].
40. Force, supra note 1, at 131. See also Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1162-63 (1993).
Cooley looked to the cases coming from the different state courts to find the
common principles of state constitutionalism-and, ultimately, of American
constitutionalism. Just as his contemporaries looked to the case law from different
jurisdictions to find the common principles of tort or contract, Cooley aimed to describe
an American constitutionalism that was the common object of each state court's
interpretive effort. The diversity of state courts, each claiming a unique authority, did
not prevent their engagement in a common interpretive enterprise.
Id. at 1163 (footnotes omitted).
41. Force, supra note 1, at 130-32.
42. Id. at 132-35.
43. Id. at 137.
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This was particularly important before the advent of the national research
sources cited earlier." It is this kind of comparative analysis, both of the state
constitutional textual provisions themselves, as well as thejudicial interpretations
thereof, that facilitates what we now refer to as "horizontal federalism"' as
a component of the New Judicial Federalism.
Professor Force pointed out something that is still not widely recognized
enough-that state constitutions "include a number of subjects not covered in the
Federal Bill of Rights." He included an appendix to his article providing the
citations to all of the state constitutional rights provisions.47 These charts are
still useful today.
In 1988, two commentators on the status of state constitutional law
scholarship observed: "[M]ost of the literature, like many of the state cases
themselves, offers more in terms of approval and encouragement than of
analytical insight and innovation ....
More attention must be devoted to new
conceptualizations in constitutional doctrine.""
Dr. G. Alan Tarr observed in 1991:
The new judicial federalism, now middle-aged, can no longer be
sustained by the sense of discovery that sparked it initially. If
advances are to be made in state constitutional law, they will come
through more sustained reflection about the nature of state
constitutions and through a dialogue with scholars outside the field of
state constitutional law. State constitutional scholars have long
recognized the distinctive origins and character of state constitutions.
Now they need to reflect on the implications of that distinctiveness for

44. See supra notes 25, 27-31 and accompanying text.
45. This is a term from MARY CORNELIA PORTER & G. ALAN TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS:

POLICYMAKERS INTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM xxi-xxii (1982). In the words of New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice Stewart G. Pollock, "[Hiorizontal federalism, a federalism in which states look to each
other for guidance, may be the hallmark of the rest of the century." Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate
andIndependent State Grounds as a Means of Balancingthe RelationshipBetween State and Federal
Courts, 63 TEx. L. REv. 977, 992 (1985).
46. Force, supra note 1, at 141.

47. Id. at 165.
48. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, 7he Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87
MicH. L. REV. 189, 217-18 (1988). Collins and Skover suggested that law schools' constitutional
law curricula, generally ignoring state constitutional law, contributed to this lack of quality
scholarship about state constitutional law. Id. at 218. Jefferson Fordham observed: 'Another
aspect of constitutional law to be noted is the slighting of state constitutional law in legal education
....
[Sltate constitutional law is both a substantial component of the constitutional system and
something of very real professional significance to lawyers." Jefferson Fordham, Some Observations
Upon Uneasy American Federalism, 58 N.C. L. REV. 289, 293 (1980).
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state constitutional interpretation. 49
Not everyone, of course, applauded the New Judicial Federalism. As Dr.
Barry Latzer has observed: "Conservatives, dismayed by rights-expansive
repudiations of Supreme Court doctrine by state courts, argue that such
rejectionism is often unprincipled, especially when textual differences between
the state and federal constitutional provisions are minor. "'
Even more recently, James A. Gardner has argued that "state constitutional
law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially
unintelligible pronouncements" 51 and that "state constitutional discourse is
impoverished and inadequate to the tasks that any constitutional discourse is
designed to accomplish." 52
After having concluded that state constitutional discourse is impoverished,
Professor Gardner asserted that this is caused by the failure of state
constitutionalism generally. 3 He pointed to the inclusion of mere statutory
detail in state constitutions (reflecting political compromise), and the frequency
with which they are amended or revised to conclude that state constitutionalism
is a failed enterprise.' The "poverty of state constitutional discourse merely
reflects the limited narrative possibilities that state constitutions offer to erstwhile
interpreters. "" A truly diverse set of independent constitutional values, at least
in rights cases, was even said to be dangerous to our national community. 6
Ultimately, Professor Gardner contended that "the communities in theory
defined by state constitutions simply do not exist, and debating the meaning of
a state constitution does not involve defining an identity that any group would
recognize as its own.'

49. G. Alan Tarr, ConstitutionalTheory and State ConstitutionalInterpretation, 22 RUTGERS
L.J. 841, 861 (1991).
50. Barry Latzer, The New JudicialFederalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a
Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 863 (1991).
51. James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourseofState Constitutionalism, 90MICH. L. REv. 761,
763 (1992).
52. Id. at 766.
53. Id. at 812 (noting "the failure of state constitutionalism itself to provide a workable model
for the contemporary practice of constitutional law and discourse on the state level").
54. Id. at 818-22.
55. Id. at 822.
56. Id. at 827.
57. Id. at 837.
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These are very strong and provocative conclusions. They are continuing
to stimulate useful discussions of what state constitutional law is all about.'
Much of that discussion will continue to analyze state constitutional law as it
relates to federal constitutional law, in comparative or relational terms.
We now know that state constitutional law is here to stay. There is much
importance in the field beyond rights cases. Regarding rights cases, though,
whether one views judicial interpretation of state constitutions in neutral political
terms,5 9 or as a welcome avenue for progressive litigation in the face of
conservative changes in federal constitutional law and federal courts,'m or, by
contrast, as an unwarranted reflection of "political liberalism," 6' state
constitutional law is a fact of life. Methodology problems in interpreting and
applying state constitutional rights provisions, however, especially those which
have been overshadowed by similar federal constitutional provisions, will not be
worked out overnight, or even within a single generation. 62 As Justice Shirley
S. Abrahamson of Wisconsin recently observed:
Just as it seems strange to lawyers in 1990 that in the early part of the
twentieth century the federal Bill of Rights did not extend to protection
of individuals against state government, future generations may look
back and wonder why state courts have ignored their state constitutions
for so long.'
State constitutions are, actually, difficult to appreciate. Justice Hans A.
Linde recognized this but moved beyond it:
Most state constitutions are dusty stuff - too much detail, too much

58. Professor Gardner's article has generated a wide response. See, e.g., Robert F. Utter, The
Practiceof Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 1153 (1992); David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91
MICH. L. REv. 274 (1992); Jeffrey A. Parness, Failed or Uneven Discourse of State
Constitutionalism?: Governmental Structure and State Constitutions, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 155
(1992); Neil H. Cogan, In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173 (1992). See
also James A. Gardner, Discourse and Difference-A Reply to Parnessand Cogan, 5 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 193 (1992); Roundtable, Responses to James A. Gardner, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993).
59. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REv.
1081 (1985).
60. See generally Daniel R. Gordon, ProgressivesRetreat: Falling Back from the Federal
Constitution to State Constitutions, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801 (1991). See also Kahn, supra note 6, at
464 ("State Constitutionalism represented a kind of forum shopping for liberals.").
61. Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New JudicialFederalism," 2 EMERGING
ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 233, 233 (1989).
62. See generally Williams, Methodology Problems, supra note 39.
63. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutionsin a More Perfect Union,
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 744 (1991).
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diversity, too much debris of old tempests in local teapots, too much
preoccupation with offices, their composition and administration, and
forever with money, money, money. In short, no grand vision, no
overarching theory, nothing to tempt a scholar aspiring to national
recognition. Serious theorists understandably care about methods,
principles, and outcomes that have nationwide importance. They are
willing to let the states pursue their local peculiarities by statutes, by
common law, or by interpreting or amending state constitutions; and
who can blame them?
Yet I think this is a loss to theory.'M
This current Symposium is a striking example of how far the field of state
constitutional law has come since 1969. After the calls in the 1980s for a
higher-level of intellectual analysis of state constitutional law, the discussion in
recent years has become much more sophisticated. 5
Paul Kahn's articleM presents a "big picture" look at the first generation
of the New Judicial Federalism. He notes that the New Judicial Federalism is
a "complex reaction" 67 to changes in the United States Supreme Court.
Professor Kahn aims his analysis at the potential for state constitutional law to
contribute to fairness or "doing the right thing."'
He notes that a
"government can be judged unfair either because of the values it pursues or
because it acts in an arbitrary manner. The first form of unfairness reflects
substantive disagreement over the correct public values; the second reflects
disagreement with particular efforts to apply common values."'
Professor
Kahn then makes a very interesting, although likely controversial, argument that
state courts interpreting state constitutions are less able to achieve the former
type of fairness than the latter. Professor Kahn then utilizes a case study of the

64. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165,
196-97 (1984).
65. See Kahn, supra note 40; Gardner, supra note 51; Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and
Autonomy: The Jurisprudenceof InterpretationinState ConstitutionalLaw, 26 CONN. L. REv. 635
(1994); James G. Pope, An Approach to State ConstitutionalInterpretation,24 RUrGERS L.J. 985
(1993); Lawrence Schlam, State ConstitutionalAmending, IndependentInterpretation,and Political
Culture: A Case Study in ConstitutionalStagnation,43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269 (1994); G. Alan Tarr,
UnderstandingState Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169 (1992); John Devlin, Constructing an
Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey,
Critique and Proposal,21 RUTGERS L.J. 819 (1990).
66. Kahn,supra note 6.
67. Id.at 459. Professor Kahn also notes that Justice Brennan's 1977 article "is often taken
as the starting point of a new scholarly attention to state constitutionalism." Id. at 459 n.2.
68. See Suzanna Sherry, Foreword, State Constitutional Law: Doing the Right Thing, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 935 (1994).
69. Kahn, supra note 6, at 460.
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well-known educational finance litigation under state constitutions to illustrate
his thesis.
It is true, of course, that the litigation seeking equity in the financing of
public schools has been one of the leading and most sustained areas of state
constitutional litigation. As the article by Dean Frank Macchiarola and Joseph
Diaz7' points out, the school finance litigation has spanned the entire first
generation of the New Judicial Federalism. Much of this litigation has centered
on explicit provisions concerning education that are contained in state
constitutions. The inclusion of such education provisions has been described by
James Gray Pope as an example of an instance where "state constitutional
lawmaking clearly includes episodes of determined popular deliberation and
struggle over issues of high principle.""' In addition to its focus on these
specific state constitutional education provisions, the school finance litigation has
also relied strongly on equality arguments.' Dean Macchiarola and Mr. Diaz
trace the interaction between those two complimentary legal theories.73 The
area of school finance litigation has been a favorite for scholars of state
constitutional law to illustrate the "states-as-laboratories" metaphor.
James Gardner, in his article in this Symposium looks directly at, and
challenges, the "states-as-laboratories" metaphor.74 Justice Brandeis' famous
reference to the experimental potential of state law is cited by almost all
commentators on state constitutional law. Professor Gardner, though, joins Earl

70. Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorderin the Courts: 7he Aftermath of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 551
(1996).
71. Pope, supra note 65, at 991. Professor Pope reported:
During the nineteenth century, educational reformers placed free public education
on the constitutional agenda of many states. At stake were such basic issues as whether

the state should take over the function, traditionally performed by churches, of educating
children in moral fundamentals, whether poor families could obtain the benefits of
education without declaring themselves paupers, and whether an ethnically and
economically diverse country needed common schools to provide its people with
common values.
Id. at 992-93.
I have referred to these educational provisions as examples of "other provisions, not usually
found inbills of rights, [which] expressly require equality inspecific and limited instances." Robert
F. Williams, Equality Guaranteesin State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1214 (1985).
72. Robert F. Williams, Foreword: 7he Importance of an Independent State Constitutional
Equality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675 (1992).
73. Macchiarola & Diaz, supra note 70, at 561-77. See also Michael Heise, State
Constitutions, School FinanceLitigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
FinanceReform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101 (1995).
74. James A. Gardner, The "States-As-LaboratoriesmMetaphorin
State ConstitutionalLaw, 30
VAL. U. L. REv. 475 (1996).
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Maltz in suggesting that the experimental model does not really further the
objectives of federalism.75 Professor Gardner sheds important light on the
actual context of the famous Brandeisian quote. I myself recently referred to
Florida's Interest on Trust Account Program, under which the interest from
lawyers' trust accounts is pooled for the benefit of legal services and other
public interest projects, as "one of the most spectacularly successful Brandeisian
'state laboratory' experiments of our time."76 Florida's innovation, under the
leadership of then Chief Justice Arthur England, was accomplished through
judicial rulemaking. 7
Interestingly, in a case eleven years before Justice Brandeis' famous
statement, Justice Holmes, in a similar context, dissented from a decision
striking down a state statute.' He stated, using the now-familiar metaphor:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent
the maling of social experiments that an important part of the
community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several
States, even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious
to me and to those whose judgment I most respect. 79
Justice Brandeis also dissented in the case," but his opinion said nothing about
experiments. Eleven years later he used the "states-as-laboratories" metaphor
in the way we all now recognize.81

75. Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Conceptof Federalism,496 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 98, 100-01 (1988); see also Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-JusticeBrennan and
the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988).
76. Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Stories of State ConstitutionalLaw, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 715, 718 (1994).

77. Id. at 718 n.12. See also Maeva Marcus, Louis D. Brandeis and the Laboratories of
Democracy, in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND 75 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992); DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM:

A DIALOGUE 85-86 (1995).

78. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (emphasis added).

See generally Samuel Krislov, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the

FederalIdea, in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 77, at 37.
80. Truax, 257 U.S. at 354 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
81. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting):
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the

Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. at 311.
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The term that political scientists use for the "states-as-laboratories"
metaphor is the study of the "diffusion of innovations.'
Political scientists
are normally referring to the diffusion of legislative innovations which, of
course, is what Justice Brandeis was talking about. The metaphor has had great
power not only for scholars of American state constitutional law this century, but
also for scholars of European federalism last century. For example, an analyst
of Swiss federalism in 1898 gave the following description of the Swiss cantons:
The Swiss cantons are the democratic workshops of Europe. On
their twenty-five anvils are hammered out almost every conceivable
experiment in political mechanics; and if a particular experiment
proves successful, it is adopted by one canton after another, until it
ultimately receives a definite consecration by becoming part of the
Federal Constitution, which is, indeed, largely moulded on cantonal
experience. 8

Professor Gardner's article will help all of us to evaluate the real power and
applicability of the metaphor.
The article by Judge Rex Armstrong analyzes the impact of Holmes'
aphorism about the life of the law being based on experience, not logic."
Using the experience of state constitutional law adjudication in Oregon under
the leadership of Justice Hans A. Linde, Judge Armstrong provides an explicit
response to Professor Gardner's earlier critique of state constitutional law."
I read his article as also responding, albeit by inference, to Gardner's critique
of the "states-as-laboratories" metaphor in this Symposium.'
Judge
Armstrong provides the important voice of a sitting judge to the Symposium.
One of the reasons that Paul Kahn gives for his conclusion that state
constitutional law is more likely to be able to resolve problems of arbitrariness
than to confront the debate over "correct public values" is that state judges are
often elected.' Professor Joseph R. Grodin was, of course, one of the three
members of the California Supreme Court who was defeated in the well-known

82. For an interesting study of the extent to which states actually have "experimented,* see Jack
L. Walker, 7he Dison of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. Sci. Ray. 880

(1969).
83. SIMON DEPLOIoE, THE REFERENDUM IN SwrrZERLAND xiv (1898).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 493 (1996).
Id. See also Schuman, supra note 58, at 274.
See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
Kahn, supra note 6, at 471-72.
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1986 election." Professor Grodin's article in this Symposium,' a review of
a recent book about Justice Hans A. Linde's achievements in constitutional
law, 9' also reflects the events of the first generation of the New Judicial
Federalism. Justice Linde's contributions to state constitutional law span the
entire first generation of the New Judicial Federalism. His state constitutional
law contributions have been described as "one of this century's most important
judicial contributions. . .
Professor Sanford Levinson has stated that
Justice Linde is "easily one of the three most important state court judges in this
century," comparing his work to that of Benjamin Cardozo and Roger
Traynor. 93
As Professor Grodin points out in his article, Justice Linde is welldeserving of these accolades. His work, both academic and judicial, was a
central feature in the growth of the New Judicial Federalism. Professor
Grodin's article locates Justice Linde's work, both academic and judicial, in the
larger evolving context of the growth of state constitutional law. Professor
Grodin himself, of course, has made both judicial and academic contributions
to the development of state constitutionalism.'
He continues those
contributions here.
The scholarship on state constitutional law has focused primarily on
substantive state constitutional rights. Much less attention has been given to the
collateral, but very important, areas such as retroactivity 5 and waiver of state
constitutional rights. Professor Eugene L. Shapiro's article in this Symposium
provides an in-depth analysis of the waiver issue in the specific context of the

89. Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on
Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Retention Elections and JudicialMethod: A Retrospective on the CaliforniaRetention Election of
1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the
California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70
JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
90. Joseph R. Grodin, State Constitutionalism in Practice, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 601 (1996).
91. INTELECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE HANS LINDE TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALIsM Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995) (hereinafter INTELLECT AND CRAFT]. There were
a number of tributes to Justice Linde in 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. vii (1984).
92. Louis H. Pollak, Judge-ProfessorLinde, 70 OR. L. REv. 679, 682 (1991), quoted in
INTELLECT AND CRAFT,

supra note 91, at 3 n.2.

93. Sanford Levinson, iers of Scrutiny -- From Strict Through Rational Bases - And the
Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALB. L. REv. 745, 746 (1992), quoted in
INTEuECT AND CRAFT supra note 91, at 3 n.3.
94. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE (1989); Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 391 (1988).
95. But see Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on
State PostconvictionRemedies, 44 ALA. L. REv. 421 (1993).
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right to counsel." He points out the important potential differences between
waiver of federal and state constitutional rights.'
Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard's article takes a long view back to the
origins of the New Judicial Federalism which he convincingly traces to well
before Justice Brennan's article, or even Professor Force's, for that matter.
Furthermore, he gives his response to both Professor Kahn's and Professor
Gardner's earlier work on state constitutional law. He also provides the muchneeded voice of a sitting judge.
The article by Harvey Rishikof and Alexander Wohl addresses one of the
most interesting new emerging issues, the constitutional status, both inside and
outside, of Residential Community Associations (RCAs). This is an area that
may well be left entirely to state constitutional law and reflects the larger
discussion of whether the United States Supreme Court's state action doctrine
will be followed at the state level. "0
At the 1984 National Conference on Developments in State Constitutional
Law, Professor Sanford Levinson made the following observations:
It is also worth mentioning that not only shopping centers and
private universities are implicated in any doctrines of access to private
property.
Other candidates for access include privately owned
"residential" or "retirement" communities, trailer parks, migrant labor
camps, and nursing homes, all of which may make deliberate attempts
to discourage any outsiders from entering their grounds. At least one
New Jersey case involved a trespass conviction deriving from an
attempt by a "planned retirement village" to bar unauthorized visitors
from the community grounds.
The defendant was attempting to circulate a petition involving
political issues in the local township where the retirement village was

96. Eugene L. Shapiro, Waiver of a State Constitutional Right to Counsel During PostAttachment Interrogation,30 VAL. U. L. REv. 581 (1996). For a recent, very thoughtful treatment
of the waiver issue in a slightly different context, see State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544-47
(Tenn. 1994).
97. See generally Shapiro, supra note 96. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 384-85.
98. Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State ConstitutionJurisprudence,30 VAL. U.
L. REV. 421 (1996).
99. Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Governments: "The
State Will Make the Call," 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 509 (1996). See also David J. Kennedy, Note,
Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on
Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995).
100. See WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 214-55.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [1996], Art. 13

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

located, and the court invalidated the conviction. Although the court
stated that it did "not wish to open wide the gates of Rossmoor and
[thus] allow anyone to come in at anytime, for any purpose[,]
[n]evertheless, this court feels compelled to hold ajar the gates of
Rossmoor under the present circumstances. To hold otherwise would,
in effect, create a political isolation booth." Here again it is certainly
understandable that courts hesitate to grant a general right of access to
the property even as they protect one especially important type of
speech-that concerning politics and elections. 1"'
The New Jersey case referred to by Professor Levinson was a trial-court
decision called State v. Kolcz.1°2 Until the Rishikof and Wohl article in this
Symposium, Professor Levinson's point has not been followed up.
Ultimately, one of the great questions about federalism is whether it
advances the course of individual rights protections. As Professor Dick Howard
recently noted, the record in the United States is mixed.
American federalism has had its dark chapters; its association
with the unhappy story of race and discrimination is one of those
chapters. It has had, at the same time, its rewards; to the extent that
it has helped promote pluralism, experimentation, and limits on undue
concentration of power, federalism has been a benign force in
American history. 3
Given what we have learned from the first generation of the New Judicial
Federalism, there is substantial hope for the future.
Rights protections under state constitutions, though, are not simply a "oneway ratchet." State constitutions may be interpreted to provide more rights than
the federal constitution, but state constitutions can be amended by majority vote
to take away such rights. These twin perspectives, the protection of individual
rights under state constitutions coupled with the relative ease of amendment,
Professor Harry Witte
create a paradox for state constitutional law."°
described this paradox using the example of Pennsylvania:

101. Sanford Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Access to Private PropertyUnder
State ConstitutionalLaw, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 21, at 5960.
102. 276 A.2d 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971).
103. A.E. Dick Howard, Does Federalism Secure or UndermineRights?, in FEDERALISM AND
RIGHTS 11, 25 (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996).
104. See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The
Processes of ConstitutionalChange in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383 (1993).
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Two fundamental principles were set down in the 1776 constitution:
the inviolability of basic, individual rights, and the inherent right of
the people to control, reform, or abolish their government as they saw
fit. Although each principle may be seen as critical to one ideal of
democracy or another, together they placed the right of the majority
to govern and the right of minorities to be free of certain reaches of
government in potential opposition. 5
Professor Lynn Baker recently analyzed one of the recommended solutions to
this problem-the adoption of supermajority requirements for the adoption of
initiated state constitutional amendments affecting rights.'"n There is much
work left to be done.
So, the New Judicial Federalism has begun to mature. Still, much remains
to be done in the way of scholarship." ° A fully developed study of state
constitutional law must continue to include constitutional theory,'" as well as
political theory."° It must be interdisciplinary. There is much we lawyers
can learn from historians and political scientists, and vice versa."0 The
research also must include state constitutional history, with a focus on both
individual states,"' as well as comparative regional and national
treatment." 2 The relationship between state constitutional rights and state
common-law and statutory rights must be considered."' Finally, the treatment

105. Id. at 384. See also Janice C. May, ConstitutionalAmendment and Revision Revisited,
17 PUBLJUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1987, at 153, 178-79.
106. Lynn A. Baker, Governing by Initiative: Constitutional Change and DirectDemocracy,
66 U. CoLO. L. REv. 143 (1995).
107. The following paragraph is based on Robert F. Williams, Foreword: A Research Agenda
in State ConstitutionalLaw, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1993).
108. Tarr, supra note 49, at 861.
109. Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles& TraditionsUnderlying State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS:
J. FEDERAuSM, Winter 1982, at 11.
110. See Robert F. Williams, Introduction to Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 22
RUTOERS L.J. 815, 816 (1991) (demonstrating importance of interdisciplinary approach to study of
state constitutions reflected in forewords by law professors, political scientists and historians).
111. See, e.g., Christian G. Fritz, More Than "Shreds and Patches".: California'sFirst Bill
of Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13 (1989) (explaining the extent to which existing nineteenth
century state constitutions are drawn upon in creation of bill of rights of California's first
constitution); John V. Orth, North Carolina ConstitutionalHistory, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1759 (1992)
(examining North Carolina's three constitutions over last two centuries); David Schuman, The
Creation of the Oregon Constitution, 74 OR. L. REV. 611 (1995).
112. TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTrTUTIONS (Paul Finkelman &
Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
113. See Judith S. Kaye, Foreword: The Common Law & State ConstitutionalLaw as Full
Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERs L.J. 727, 728-29 (1992) (examining
relationship of common law and state constitutional law in protection of individual rights and
suggesting partnership of two).
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of judicial interpretation of state constitutions, as well as the study of the state
constitutions themselves, must be comparative both with respect to other state
constitutions as well as the federal constitution."4 Even comparisons with the
state constitutions in other federal systems should be considered.115
Scholars, lawyers, judges and officials in other federal systems are showing
an increasing interest in American state constitutions. Judge Dorothy Beasley
of Georgia has noted this world-wide interest in state constitutional law:
With the rapid growth in democratic reform and the development of
global communications systems, state constitutional law takes on an
added significance. Not only do vigorous development and application
of state constitutions serve as laboratories on constitutionalism for our
own nation's progress, but state constitutional law offers new
democracies the opportunity to view varied constitutional theories
which may be implemented abroad."I6
Clearly, as the New Judicial Federalism moves to maturity and gains stature
as a field of scholarly endeavor, interest in it should increase. A full agenda
remains for both scholars and the courts, and the work of each compliments the
other. One of the earliest studies of state constitutional law noted that "what the
state courts produce is at least partially a function of what commentators and
litigants expect them to produce."" 7 Developments during the first phase of
the New Judicial Federalism seem to have illustrated this connection.
Ultimately, though, the quality of state constitutional discourse depends on what
the scholars, lawyers and judges continue to do in the next phase of judicial
federalism. Justice Hans Linde predicted, as recently as 1991, that it was not
a completely rosy picture.
So the future of the "new federalism" remains doubtful. There
is no reason for confidence that most state courts will systematically
decide what their state constitutions require, either adapting someone's

114. Williams, supra note 20, at 172-73 ("[Sltate constitutions do not differ significantly from
one another .... The recurring themes and issues throughout state constitutional law... make it
susceptible to treatment on a comparative or 'all states' basis.").
115. James A. Thomson, State Constitutional Law: Some Comparative Perspectives, 20
RUTGERs L.J. 1059 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT F. WILLAMS, STATE CONSTrrTIONAL LAw: CASES
& MATERIALS (1988)); see also Robert F. Williams, A Research Agenda in Comparative State
Constitutional Law, 20 FEDERALISM REP., Fall 1994, at 3.

116. Dorothy Toth Beasley, Foreword to Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 67
TEMI. L. REV. 925, 925 (1994). See also Kincaid, supra note 33, at 944-48 (noting the potential
interest in the American New Judicial Federalism in federal systems abroad).
117. ProjectReport: TowardAn Activist Rolefor State Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 271, 320 (1973).
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federal analysis or making their own, before deciding whether their
state has violated the nation's Constitution. Perhaps the best we can
hope for is that those judges who do not abdicate their responsibility
outright will put first things first when the case is properly put to
them.
How often and how well they do it depends on the
professionalism of the younger generation of advocates in
constitutional cases as well as on the professionalism of the younger
generation of judges."
I believe that, with what has taken place in scholarship even since these
words were written in 1991, and particularly as evidenced by the contents of this
Symposium, the future is much brighter already.

118. Hans A. Linde, Does the "New Federalism" Have a Future?, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST.
CONST. L. 251, 261 (1991).
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